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Digital rights management (DRM) can be considered to be a mech-
anism to enforce access control over a resource without consider-
ing its location. There are currently no formal models for DRM,
although there has been some work in analysing and formalising
the interpretation of access control rules in DRM systems. A for-
mal model for DRM is essential to provide specific access control
semantics that are necessary for creating interoperable, unambigu-
ous implementations. In this paper, we discuss how DRM differs as
an access control model to the three well known traditional access
control models – DAC, MAC and RBAC, and using these exist-
ing approaches motivate a set of requirements for a formal model
for DRM. Thereafter, we present a formal description of LiREL,
a rights expression language that is able to express access control
policies and contractual agreement in a single use license. Our mo-
tivation with this approach is to identify the different components in
a license contract and define how these components interact within
themselves and with other components of the license. A formal
notation allows for an uniform and unambiguous interpretation and
implementation of the access control policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are many definitions and interpretations attached to the
words “Digital Rights Management”, or its better known acronym
DRM. However, Rosenblatt et al.’s definition of DRM as technolo-
gies and techniques that provide “persistent access control of dig-
ital data” [34], is perhaps the most descriptive. This definition
encompasses the requirements for both consumer DRM systems
for protecting copyrighted works on the Internet and for enterprise
DRM systems for protecting sensitive enterprise data.
For DRM to succeed, access control needs to be applied regard-
less of location of the data. However, traditional access control
mechanisms have largely been restricted inside a defined boundary
(such as an enterprise or a device) and this is the most significant
difference between DRM and existing access control mechanisms.
Furthermore, traditional access control approaches may not be en-
tirely suitable for the purposes of DRM.
As discussed by Jajodia et al in [24], access control has two dis-
tinct parts, which are dependent on each other to function properly:
1. The means to represent the policies controlling access to a
resource.
2. The means to implement the policies correctly and effec-
tively.
Because the latter is almost a purely logical process, most access
control models have been based on some sort of logical notation.
In DRM systems, access control rules for an object are expressed
in a use license. Use licenses are expressed in rights expression
languages (RELs), of which there are two major, general purpose
RELs – MPEG REL based on XrML and ODRL [10].
In the XrML 2.0 specifications [1] the requirements for a REL
are given as:
• Comprehensive: A language that shall be capable of express-
ing simple and complex rights in any stage in a workflow,
lifecycle or business model.
• Generic: A language shall be capable of describing rights for
any type of digital content or service (an ebook, a file system,
a video or a piece of software)
• Precise: a language shall communicate precise meaning to
all players in the system.
There are a number of criticisms of current REL implementa-
tions; particularly with regards to the expression of legal require-
ments when enforcing copyright [28, 12]. Mulligan et al. argues
that RELs like XrML cannot be considered comprehensive until
users are able to request additional rights [28]. They argue that this
ability is crucial for the enabling of fair use. Felten on the other
hand argues that DRM systems will never allow fair use since the
languages cannot handle the expressions and the AI complexities
in fair use [12]. In these respects, they argue that current RELs are
not comprehensive.
Bechtold however argues that many of the XrML rules and def-
initions like rights transfers are not implemented in current DRM
systems [7] and thus the failure of DRM systems to have fair use
is not hampered by the language. Bechtold maintains that a suite
of programs that can implement all the rules and definitions avail-
able in XrML will be able to achieve most of the requirements of
DRM systems with less compromise from right holders [7]. This
would require users to communicate with the right holder to re-
quest additional rights or changes in rights, as argued by Mulligan
et al. In [3], Arnab and Hutchison detailed extensions to ODRL that
would allow for bi-directional communications. The latest mod-
els for ODRL v2.0 incorporate some of the features discussed by
Arnab and Hutchison [23].
While the above arguments have been in favour of extending the
capabilities of RELs, Jamkhedkar et al. argued in [26], that there
are a number of problems with current approaches to RELs. First,
general purpose RELs have become too complicated, and by trying
to address all the parts of DRM, they do not address any of the
part completely. Although RELs are already modelled on access
control models [28], Jamkhedkar et al. argued that there is no real
definition of an access control model for DRM, and thus there is no
mechanism to evaluate and inter-operate between different RELs.
The authors promoted the need for a simpler model, encompassing
a stateless, language-neutral, rights model; but did not present any
rights model for DRM.
There have been no formal investigations into RELs from the
vendors themselves. Halpern and Weissman detailed formalised
semantics to XrML in [20], while Pucella and Weissman detailed a
similar investigation into ODRL in [31]. Both papers investigated
the current problems with interpreting use licenses, and the sources
of ambiguities. Pucella and Weissmann also discussed a logic for
reasoning about and interpretation of license agreements in [30].
In some respects, these investigations found that both XrML and
ODRL were not necessarily precise in conveying their intended
meaning.
While these investigations examined the interpretation of exist-
ing languages, they did not seek to put the languages on a com-
pletely formal base. In [19], Guth et al. did investigate the require-
ments for a contract language, and developed a contract schema
(CoSa). In [18], Guth had a more comprehensive discussion on
CoSa, the relationship between contracts and use licenses and the
requirements for rights expression languages. While CoSa pro-
vided a formal structure, this approach does not extend to RELs
and there is currently no formal description for any REL.
Thus, while both ODRL and XrML are generic in nature, and can
cater for any type of digital resource [10], both can be considered
to be non comprehensive and imprecise.
In this paper we present a formal model for DRM, by defining a
persistent access control model in section 5, including a discus-
sion on the requirements for an access control model for DRM
in section 3, and refining the model through these requirements.
Our motivation is to identify the various factors required to define
the access control policies and how these factors interact between
themselves (if there are multiple factors) and with the other factors
in the policy. Our contribution differs from [20] and [31] in that
we are creating an access control model from the ground up, while
the previous contributions have examined existing languages and
models before suggesting improvements.
In this paper, we also discuss how well existing and proposed
RELs satisfy our model, but very briefly. Before we present our
access control model for DRM, we briefly discuss existing access
control models in section 2 and why they are not completely suit-
able for DRM. Before concluding, we discuss the interpretation and
enforcement of our formal model in section 6.
2. EXISTING ACCESS CONTROL
MECHANISMS
Currently, there are three widely accepted access control models:
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). In this section,
we will briefly review these models, before we discuss how DRM
differs from these models.
2.1 DAC, MAC and RBAC
In DAC based systems, access to data objects is restricted based
on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong [29].
Furthermore, in DAC based systems, a user with access to the pro-
tected data can delegate access to other users. DAC does have a
number of specification levels, and criteria B3 to A1 requires im-
plementors to allow creators to control the propagation of access
delegation to other users (which would be necessary for DRM sys-
tems) [29], but as discussed by Reid and Caelli, modern operating
systems implement a simpler version of DAC [32] which does not
allow such controls. They argued that DAC based operating sys-
tems allow ordinary users of the system to define their own security.
By granting ordinary users this ability, a user could reconfigure the
security policy of the system to subvert the DRM protection. The
authors also point out the inability of mainstream operating systems
to support the principle of least privilege. Since system privileges
are based on the users’ identity, any program executing on behalf
of a user is granted the same access control privileges as the user.
There are no efficient mechanisms for restricting users’ access con-
trol rights.
In MAC based systems, and in the associated Multi-Level se-
curity (MLS) systems proposed by Bell and LaPadula [9, 8], ac-
cess control is assured through a central security administrator, and
thus ordinary users of the system are prevented from reconfiguring
the computer’s security policy [33]. However, for the purposes of
DRM, the rights holders (or the owners of the data) are not guaran-
teed any control over the consuming device.
In MAC based systems, access control is based on the user’s
credentials, with users classified under a hierarchical structure, dis-
cussed in the Bell-LaPadula model [8, 9]. The hierarchical struc-
ture allows greater rights for some users while allowing lesser rights
for other users. Protected objects are classified under this structure,
and the object does not determine the level of access for the user.
This creates a problem for DRM systems, where it is sometimes
necessary to determine access according to the nature of the object
as opposed to the classification of the user. For example, the author
of an article can be classified as a rights-holder and a reader. How-
ever, the classification of the author as a rights-holder means that
he has access to other works that are not necessarily his own.
The third and newest, popular access control model is Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC), first described by Ferraiolo and
Kuhn in [15], and subsequently detailed further by Ferraiolo et al.
in [14], as well as Sandhu et al. in [35] and von Solms and van
der Merwe in [39]. Ferraiolo and Kuhn argued that access to data
should be determined by the function of the users in relation to the
data, which are usually defined by roles users play in an organi-
sation [15]. For this reason, a role-based access control model is
more suitable than the DAC or MAC based approaches that were
available at the time. von Solms and van der Merwe further argued
that the role-based approach is a combination of the resource-based
approach (as found in DAC) and the user-based approach (as found
in MAC) [39].
A pure role-based approach is however not suitable for DRM, for
two reasons. Firstly, a pure role-based approach may not be able
to distinguish access depending on the function of the object (as
opposed to the function of the user), which would create a problem
similar to the author-user problem discussed earlier. Secondly, the
definition of roles is determined by individual organisations, and
these roles vary from organisation to organisation; and sometimes
differ within organisations. This problem could be solved by defin-
ing access roles with respect to the organisation (or department);
but this would severely restrict portability of sensitive data between
organisations.
2.2 Differences between DRM and Existing
Access Control Models
The main difference between DRM and traditional access con-
trol however, remains on the boundary of control. Traditional ac-
cess control models operate on an object within a defined boundary:
either a system or organisation. DRM however aims to operate on
objects that do not have any defined boundaries, and thus across
different systems and organisations.
The definition of the boundaries in existing access control mod-
els determine user management of these systems. Traditional ac-
cess control models are strongly coupled with user management,
and it is therefore possible to specify the complete range of re-
sources accessible to a particular user or role.
Since DRM does not operate in a defined boundary, such a spec-
ification is not easily made. Instead, a DRM policy should aim to
specify whether a particular user has access to a particular resource.
It is possible for a producer to keep track of which users have access
to a particular resource, but will never be able to track all the re-
sources accessible by a particular user; unless the user management
is completely bounded to the DRM system. However, it should be
possible for DRM systems to have no direct relationship with user
management; as long as the user management provider is trusted
by the producer.
Role and group membership evaluation is also different in DRM
systems. In RBAC and MAC, the enforcement mechanism has to
decide whether a user is part of a specific group or fulfils a specific
role. Alternatively, the enforcement mechanism can ask another
system (usually the user management system) for help in making
such a decision.
However in a DRM system, the consumer is not guaranteed to
be online, nor can the consumer’s device be trusted to make such a
decision (since group and role membership is dynamic). Thus, the
user management system has to provide proof of such membership.
For this reason, hierarchies associated with RBAC and MAC user
management are not directly relevant to DRM systems. The user
management system associated with the DRM system has to cater
for such functionality, but the DRM system itself does not care for
the structure of such hierarchies. This is a significant difference in
the functionality of DRM when compared to RBAC and MAC.
2.3 XACML and RELs
While RELs have had no formal foundations, this is not the case
for other access control specification languages, where there are nu-
merous contributions. In [27], Kudo and Hada described a formal
model for a XML based access control language: XML access con-
trol language (XACL), which can be considered as a fore-runner to
the OASIS standardised eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) [16].
XACML is a generic access control specification language, and
should therefore be able to specify DRM use licenses. However, as
discussed by Guth in [18], generic languages cannot guarantee re-
liability in covering all the requirements, although they do provide
a high degree in flexibility.
Kudo and Hada identified the following elements in the primary
policy definition of XACL:
• the object,
• the subject wishing to acccess the object,
• the action the subject wishes to perform and
• the context in which the subject wishes to perform the action.
Other schemes, such as the discussions by Jajodia et al. [24], Dai
and Alves-Foss [11] and Ferraiolo et al. [13] use similar main com-
ponents, with the addition of roles but without taking context into
account. Arnab and Hutchison discussed in [4] that DRM use li-
censes are contractual agreements. Thus, use licenses need to be
equivalent to contracts in form; and thus require additional infor-
mation not required in existing access control specifications. We
discuss these additional requirements next, in section 3.
3. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
RELS
DRM should not be seen as a mechanism to enforce copyright
law but rather as a mechanism to enforce contracts on access and
usage of digital data. In such a view, the primary role of a REL
is not to express copyright but rather to express contractual agree-
ments between the user and the rights holders regarding the terms
and conditions of accessing the digital resource. This legal model
applies to enterprise and consumer DRM systems. While contracts
are generally formless, they do have certain features which need to
be represented in a REL model; which is a formal representation of
the syntax and semantics of the language.
1. The Licensor: Current access control policies only denote
the subject of the policies. However, a contractual agree-
ment requires the specification of the party that will
provide the service or product, and the subject can in
fact be anonymous. The licensor does not have to be
the actual rights holder but rather a party that has been
given the right to provide licenses to other parties.
2. Agreement and Obligation: A contract is an agreement be-
tween two or more parties, creating obligations for the
parties to uphold [37]. Agreements give rise to obli-
gations (and hence becomes a contract) when penal-
ties are declared should a party not fulfill its part of
the agreement; i.e. the licensee is penalised if they do
not pay (the access to the work is removed for exam-
ple) or the licensor is penalised if the quality of service
promised is not delivered (the rights holder refunds the
user for example). In [35], Sandhu et al. discussed
role-based access control models that specifically did
not handle obligations, because of the complexities in-
volved. The requirements specifications for ODRL v2
also has a discussion on the need to include obligations
associated to contracting parties and individual permis-
sions [22].
3. Contract Constraints: In [5] Arnab and Hutchison, detailed
a few legal requirements with respects to contracts in
DRM use licenses. Contract constraints are limitations
applicable to the entire contract and not to a specific
permission, like the number of devices that can be used
by the user and the period of validity for a contract.
4. Delegation of Rights: A delegate can be defined as “a per-
son authorized to act as representative for another” [2].
In rights delegation, the current licensor delegates the
licensee the authority to act as a licensor to a set of
other licensees. If possible, the licensor should be able
to control every part of the use license for delegation.
Delegation is important, as it allows the original rights
holder to control delegation down the DRM value chain.
5. Support for Third Parties: Contracts can specify third par-
ties, who can be appointed in various capacities such
as mediators, monitors, escrow agencies etc. Note that
third parties in the contract are not involved in the agree-
ment itself.
As discussed earlier, in [26], Jamkhedkar et al. categorised dif-
ferent features available in current RELs, and proposed that most
of these features be removed. We discuss these categories in detail
below including their effect on the REL model.
1. Authentication Protocol: Authentication is a vital compo-
nent of any access control model. While the protocol
may not be necessary, an access control model will still
require information relating to the identities for various
users and resources. Furthermore, as DRM operates in
a global space, these identities must also operate in a
global namespace.
2. Payment Mechanisms: The terms of payment is an obliga-
tion, and thus must be expressible as such. Thus, there
is no need to cater for payment as a separate component
of RELs.
3. Rights Enforcement: This refers to the possible semantics
implied by the REL (for example, if the right is to play
a song once, when does the counter get incremented).
Jamkhedkar et al. proposed a separation between the
expression and interpretation of access control rights,
and thus proposed that rights enforcement should not
be coupled with rights expression.
4. Content Tracking: Quite a few technologies have been pro-
posed to try content tracking as part of DRM. For this
reason, RELs have developed mechanisms to express
these requirements. Content tracking can be part of the
description of the resource itself, or part of the terms
and conditions. It does not need to be part of the access
control model, but does need to be catered for.
5. License Management: License management refers to a num-
ber of issues, like the delegation of licenses and ag-
gregation of licenses. As discussed earlier, delegation
needs to be part of the access control model, but other
functions such as aggregation could be removed.
6. Negotiation Protocol: The negotiation protocols for DRM
discussed by Arnab and Hutchison in [5] are largely
REL agnostic. However, some aspects of negotiation
require support from the REL, but this is a matter of vo-
cabulary and not the syntax and semantics of the REL.
One exception is the attribute “negotiable”, attached to
every element of the offers, indicating whether the el-
ement is negotiable or not. We do not incorporate this
attribute into the model directly, but needs to be incor-
porated in implementation. The default state of this
attribute should be“true”. Since a contract is also the
end result of a negotiation process; and the REL must
be seamlessly integrated with the negotiation protocols
without imposing too much overhead.
While Jamkhedkar et al. have recently promoted a move to
minimise the requirements for RELs, published requirements for
ODRL are quite numerous [22], and most of these were published
before their discussion. Some of these rights, such as delegation
of rights have been discussed; but some REL specific requirements
remain important. We have identified the following requirements,
which have an impact on the REL model.
Req 1.2: Support the transfer of rights for content that is
aggregated/dis-aggregated When there is delegation of rights,
it may be necessary to delegate rights for only parts of a
resource. The access control model needs to be powerful
enough to express this.
Req 1.7: Provide a “NOT” expression In RELs, and in general,
most access control models operate on granting access ex-
plicitly stated and denying any rights not stated. Jajodia et
al. defined such policies as open policies [24]. In [22], the
requirement for a “NOT” expression is motivated by the need
to express agreements in the fashion of “allow rights for all
actions except x”. Such a requirement is analogous to closed
policies defined by Jajodia et al. However, as we discuss in
our model later, neither open nor closed policies make sense
in the DRM space.
Req 1.8: Support rights and duties for all contract parties Obli-
gations are not restricted to specific permissions, but could
be tied to the entire agreement.
Some of the scenarios described as part of context by Kudo and
Hadi [27] have been discussed above. The model for DRM we
present here does not take any further contexts into account, and
thus we do not include context as a separate entity in our model.
4. A LICENSING REL: LIREL
Figure 1: Comparing RELs functionalities [17]
In [17], Gonzalez commented that RELs can be seen in a spec-
trum, as shown in figure 1. At one end, there are RELs that try to
represent copyright ideas and thus can express legal ideas such as
fair use. On the other end of the spectrum are RELs that express
access control rules. As we have previously discussed, DRM sys-
tems are not for the enforcement of copyright laws; but rather an
enforcement of licensing terms and conditions, thus they are also a
form of access control. For this reason, we think RELs should be
able to express a legal contract, but at the same time, that contract
should be able to define access control policies.
In the next section, we present a formal definition for a Licensing
Rights Expression Langauge or LiREL. This language is structured
in the form of a licensing contract but is also able to express the
access control policies required for DRM systems.
5. A FORMAL DESCRIPTION FOR LIREL
In this section we define a formal description for LiREL, using
set notation. The notation is comparable to the notation used by
Pucella and Weissmann in [30] and is also similar to the notation
used by Ferraiolo et al. in [14] and in other access control speci-
fications. A formal description provides specific semantics around
access control, a necessary step for creating interoperable, unam-
biguous implementations. We also draw upon some of the require-
ments defined in the draft versions of ODRL v2 specified in [22,
23] to specify some of the requirements for individual elements.
As already discussed, a DRM use license is essentially a contract
between two parties: the licensor and the licensee. A contract C,
between two parties, a and b, any third parties involved (pi) and the
agreement α can expressed with the following tuple as:
C = (a, b, pi, α)
For DRM use licenses, the contract needs to include details of the
resources addressed in the license (r), the constraints for the con-
tract (κ), and should be signed by representatives of the licensorsλ.
Thus a DRM use license L can be expressed as:
L = (C, r, κ)‖DSigλ
This can be expanded, and (1) defines a DRM use license as:
L = (a, b, pi, r, α, κ)‖DSigλ (1)
Note that there can be more than one signator for a license, and
the licensor can also be a signator on a license. Also, it is not always
necessary to have a signed contract, although it is considered to be
good practice.
5.1 Language Semantics and Syntax vs
Language Vocabulary
In this section we define the syntax and the semantics for a REL.
In terms of natural languages, this is comparable to the definition of
what is a noun, a verb or a pronoun etc., and how these can be com-
bined to form a sentence. The vocabulary is the second component
of the language, which allows for the expression of these terms. We
do not focus on the vocabulary of LiREL; and while a standardised
vocabulary is essential for interoperability, it will be difficult for us
to define a comprehensive vocabulary for LiREL. For this reason,
we focus solely on the syntax and semantics of LiREL and allow
for the definition of the associated vocabulary separately. This ap-
proach is also used by ODRL and XrML although some compar-
isons of RELs tend to discuss the vocabulary of the languages [17,
36].
5.2 Obligations
Almost every term in a license can have obligations attached to
it, and hence we begin our discussion with obligations, also re-
ferred to as duties by Guth [18]. As discussed earlier, some authors
have felt that obligations add too much complexity to access con-
trol specifications [35], but obligations are a fundamental part of
contracts, and thus necessary for DRM use licenses. Some obli-
gations, like payment terms, can be enforced at machine level, but
others are purely legal in nature; and disputes that arise will need
to be resolved in arbitration or a court of law. Obligations can also
have constraints attached to define limitations to obligations.
An obligation definition in a use license should contain the nec-
essary details of the obligation, and should be able to specify whether
the obligation is negotiable.
5.3 Constraints
Constraints define restrictions for specific terms in a license (such
as the number of times an action is allowed), or apply to the license
on the whole (such as the period of validity of the license). License
constraints apply to every member of both a and b, but not neces-
sarily to any delegated parties. Constraints can also be applied to
obligations. As discussed in [23], constraints can be used to express
mathematical terms, such as:
number of pages is less than 100
where “number of pages” and “100” are operands and “less than”
is the operator.
In addition to constraints, ODRL 1 also used a conditionmodel [21].
Conditions allowed a license or permission to be invalidated once
they became activated. Thus, it is possible to rewrite a condition as
a constraint, and conditions were subsequently removed from the
draft specifications of ODRL 2 [22].
All constraints applicable to the license, obligation or permission
must be met before access can be granted. Constraints themselves
can have further organisation to support different groupings. In
such a case, the semantics of the constraint will depend on the defi-
nition of the constraint. Consider the following license constraints:
1. Valid Until: 2007-12-31
2. Device restriction:
(a) device id: 8755GHGT876
(b) device id: 867453HGT97
The licensee can only be granted access to the resource if the date
of access is before 31 December, 2007 and the device that is used
to access the resource has one of the listed device identities.
A constraint definition in a use license should be able to spec-
ify whether it is negotiable, and should be capable of expressing
mathematical terms involving two operands and one operator.
5.4 The Licensors
a is the set of persons (natural or legal) who have been autho-
rised by the rights holders of the resource, to license the access to
resources r to prospective licensees. a does not need to be a com-
prehensive list, but must satisfy the following:
a = {k1o1, k2o2...knon}, a 6= ∅, n > 0 (2)
k ∈ a ⇒ ∃l ∈ r, k ∈ authorised licensors of (l) (3)
∀l ∈ r,∃k ∈ a, k ∈ authorised licensors of (l) (4)
We have provided a definition for a, in (2), every licensor (k) has
an associated set of obligations o, with (3) providing a definition
of a licensor while (4) also describes the relationship between the
licensor and the resources. This definition of a licensor allows for a
license to reference licensors who do not operate licenses on works
referenced in the license, thus catering for licensing of compilations
of works.
a should be interpreted as a list of licensors, and there is no rela-
tionship necessary between licensors. The rights holders should be
referenced through a globally unique identity scheme. It should be
noted that obligations for the rights holders could be purely legal
in nature (for example, 24-hour telephonic support), and not en-
forceable on a computer system. However, this should be seen as a
strength since it gives the use license a sounder legal grounding.
A licensor definition in a use license must specify the licensor’s
identifier.
5.5 The Licensees
b is the set of persons (natural or legal) or roles representing the
consumers of the resources defined in r, defined in (5), while we
define what is meant by a user in (6). Note, that unlike a, b can be
defined as an empty set, and thus accommodate anonymous users.
b should primarily be interpreted as a list of users who are given
the permissions defined by α.
b = {k1o1, k2o2...knon} n ≥ 0 (5)
k ∈ b ⇒ ∀l ∈ r, k gets access to l, under conditions α (6)
However unlike licensors, it should be possible to create relation-
ships between the users (and roles). For example, it should be pos-
sible to define a user list as:
b = {(Alice∧Journalist), (Bob), (Eve∧Teacher∧Mrs Smith)}
Thus, unlike for a, the definition for k in b is no longer just a
single identity, but rather a group of identities or roles as defined
in (7). To meet (6), all the roles and identities comprising ki must
be satisfied for ki to gain access to a resource. Individual iden-
tities/roles may also have obligations, as well as obligations that
affect ki as a whole.
kioi = {j1o1 ∧ j2o2 ∧ ... ∧ jtot} · oi (7)
t > 0
0 ≤ i ≤ n
where j is a person, role or group associated with a identity scheme.
Like the licensors, licensees should be referenced through a glob-
ally unique identity scheme, preferably the same scheme used to
reference licensors. Roles can be catered for by a credentials ser-
vice, and although a global credentials service does not currently
exist, setting up such a service should not be too difficult. Some
identity systems, like Kerberos, already provide a credential ser-
vice.
A licensee definition in a use license must specify the licensee’s
identifier and must be able to indicate whether the inclusion of the
licensee in the use license is negotiable.
5.6 The Third Parties
pi is the set of persons (natural or legal) who have been appointed
as third parties by both a and b as part of the agreement α.
pi = {k1o1, k2o2...knon} n ≥ 0 (8)
Similar to licensees, pi there could relationships between users
and roles appointed as third parties. For example, third parties for
an electronic contract could be:
pi = {(V erisign ∧ CertificateAuthority),
(Thawte ∧ CertificateAuthority), (John ∧ Judge)}
Thus, as for b, the definition for k in pi is no longer just a single
identity, but rather a group of identities or roles as defined in (9).
The entire third party set comprising of ki must satisfy their obliga-
tions as part of the contract. Individual identities/roles for the third
parties may also have obligations, as well as obligations that affect
ki in as a whole.
kioi = {j1o1 ∧ j2o2 ∧ ... ∧ jtot} · oi (9)
t > 0
0 ≤ i ≤ n
where j is a person, role or group associated with a identity scheme.
Like the licensors and licensees, third parties should be refer-
enced through a globally unique identity scheme, preferably the
same scheme used to reference licensors and licensees.
A third party definition in a use license must specify the third
party’s identifier and must be able to indicate whether the inclusion
of the third party in the use license is negotiable.
5.7 The Resources
r is the set of resources, which the licensees b are given access
to under conditions α by the licensors a. Licensees are given ac-
cess to all the resources identified in r. Like the licensors, licensees
and third parties, resources need a globally unique identity scheme.
Furthermore, the DRM system needs to be able to perform identity
verification for resources; i.e. establish the truth of a claimed iden-
tity [38]. However, unlike identity systems for users, most identity
systems for digital resources do not provide a verification service.
Arnab and Hutchison discussed an identity system for digital re-
sources that provide verification service in [6].
A resource definition in a use license must specify the resource’s
identifier and must be able to indicate whether the inclusion of the
resource in the use license is negotiable.
5.8 The Agreement
The agreement α is the most important part of the use license,
and defines the access control rules and policies. It is also the most
complicated part of the model. α is composed of permissions (ρ),
its constraints (κ), and obligations (o) associated with each of the
permissions. Thus, the agreement can be defined as:
α = {ρ1κ1o1, ρ2κ2o2...ρnκnon} n > 0 (10)
κi is a set of constraints applicable to the individual permission
ρi. The interpretation and definition of κi will thus depend on ρi.
Each permission ρi is part of a pre-defined permission set PS. The
definition and interpretation of PSwill differ according to the appli-
cation of DRM, and is dependent ultimately on the implementation
of the DRM controller (the system that interprets and implements
the use license) and the rights holders, where the rights holders can
choose a PS that is a subset of the entire set available from the DRM
system. For example, in the traditional Unix file system:
PS = {read, write, execute}
In the Unix file system, a permission called “print” has no meaning,
and thus cannot be enforced, even if it is expressed as part of the
use license. The rights holders can choose to reduce PS to:
P´S = {read,write}
Thus, for a use license created with reference to P´S, b will always
have the right to execute, even though the DRM controller can tech-
nically control that right. It can be argued that rights not defined in
a PS should be unregulated instead of being allowed. The problem
with this position however, is that DRM controllers can then choose
to block rights that are unregulated (e.g. do not allow execute, even
though execute 6∈ P´S). Removing blocks on unregulated permis-
sions could become difficult for the licensee, and thus our position
is to allow any rights not defined in a PS.
Using these examples, we can motivate a generalised set of con-
ditions for enforcement of rights in (11). There is a difference in
this model to the conventional view of DRM use license interpre-
tation, where only permissions granted explicitly in the use license
should be enforced (closed policy). In the third case of (11), the
license should be considered invalid.
ρ ∈ α ρ ∈ PS ⇒ ρ granted
ρ 6∈ α ρ ∈ PS ⇒ ρ denied
ρ ∈ α ρ 6∈ PS ⇒ ρ granted
ρ 6∈ α ρ 6∈ PS ⇒ ρ granted
(11)
5.8.1 A More Complex Agreement
In the current definition of agreement (10), authorised users are
given all the permissions present in α. However, there can be use
cases where a more complex agreement is required. For example,
it may be desirable to create an agreement for a PDF document as
follows (ε represents the empty set of constraints/obligations):
α = {(view·ε·ε)∨(view ·AdobePDFReader7·ε∧print·2·ε)}
This agreement can be interpreted as, the user has the right to view;
or the user can view in the application AdobePDFReader7, and also
get the right to print the document twice. There are many other
use cases where a more complex definition for agreement may be
necessary as detailed in (12), where ¯ represents the relationship
between ρiκioi and ρi+1κi+1oi+1.
α = {ρ1κ1o1 ¯ ρ2κ2o2 ¯ ... ¯ ρnκnon} (12)
However, using the distributive laws, it is possible to simplify
(12) to
α = {%1 ∨ %2 ∨ ... ∨ %m} (13)
where
%i = {ρ1κ1o1 ∧ ρ2κ2o2 ∧ ... ∧ ρtκtot}
% 6= ∅
1 ≤ i ≤ m
m > 0
t > 0
Thus, an agreement can be defined as a set of non-empty per-
mission groups, %, with each permission group consisting of a non-
empty set of permissions and their associated constraints and obli-
gations.
5.8.2 The “NOT” Permission
The “not” permission expression was initially envisaged as a
means to create easier agreements where the majority of the per-
missions (in a permission set) are allowed [22], and would thus
allow open policies in DRM. This is however simply an easier
expression mechanism at the tool level, and an unnecessary fea-
ture for the model itself. Furthermore, using the definition of the
permission set and (11), the use of a “NOT” permission is almost
meaningless. For this reason we do not have any specific support
for a “not” function.
Thus, our model cannot be categorised in either of the traditional
definitions of open and closed policies. Instead, through the use of
permission sets, we implement closed policies on only a defined set
of operations.
In DRM systems, the use of global closed policies can be dis-
advantageous to the licensee; as it leaves the possibility for the en-
forcement engines to enforce restrictions not specified as part of
the rights package, or in an extreme case, allows the producers to
update the rights enforcement engines to enforce restrictions not
specified as part of the rights package at a future date. The use of a
permission set protects the licensee from such abuse, in the present
and the future; and the licensee is guaranteed that enforcement poli-
cies will not change without a change in the policy itself.
5.8.3 Delegation
Delegation is effectively a complicated version of ρ, but one
which should probably be considered as a standard part of the LiREL
model, instead of being part of a permission set. Delegation (δ) is
really a modified version of L, and can be defined (where c is the
delegated party) as:
δ = (b´, c, p´i, r´, α´, κ´) where r´ ⊆ r, b´ ⊆ b, c 6⊆ b, c 6⊆ a
(14)
Note that p´i, α´ and κ´ are not necessarily subsets of the current pi,
α and κ. This definition also means that it is possible to create
infinitely long chain of delegation, as delegation can continue to be
part of α´.
5.8.4 Use License Specifications
A permission definition in a use license must specify the details
of the permission and must be able to indicate whether the permis-
sion of the resource in the use license is negotiable.
5.9 Catering for Negotiations
As we discussed earlier, negotiations are the means to establish-
ing a contract, but at the same time, as discussed by Jamkhedkar et
al. there is a need to minimise the complexity of RELs [26]. Thus,
it would be best, if it is possible to cater for negotiations without an
increase in the terms of the LiREL model.
Illocution Meaning
request(i,j,ϕ) a request from i to j for a proposal
based on ϕ
offer(i,j,ϕ) a proposal of ϕ from i to j
accept(i,j,ϕ) i accepts a proposal ϕ made by agent j
reject(i,j,ϕ) i rejects a proposal ϕ made by agent j
withdraw(i,j) i withdraws from negotiation with j
Table 1: Illocutions for a logic-based negotiation language as
discussed by Wooldridge and Parsons
Wooldridge and Parsons discussed a logic-based language for
bargaining-based negotiation in [40], which we have reproduced in
table 1. In their specification, the final result of a successful negoti-
ation is accept(i,j,ϕ); which is very similar to our own specification
of L.
Using the illocutions defined in table 1, and the definition of the
final agreement in (1), we can define negotiations for DRM in ta-
ble 2, which is equivalent to Wooldridge and Parson’s definitions
with ϕ = (pi, r, α, κ).
From table 2, it is clear that, except for withdrawal, there is no
real difference between each of the illocutions. In fact, each of
these illocutions can be seen as a license state. Thus, we could
cater for negotiations within LiREL without a substantial increase




request(i,j,pi, r, α, κ) a request from i to j for a proposal
based on α
offer(i,j,pi,r, α, κ) a proposal of α from i to j
accept(i,j,pi,r, α, κ) i accepts a proposal α made by j
reject(i,j,pi,r, α, κ) i rejects a proposal α made by j
withdraw(i,j) i withdraws from negotiation with j
agreement(i,j,pi,r, α, κ) i concludes an agreement with j
Table 2: Illocutions for negotiation in DRM
Details of the offer
</license>
while an agreement would look like:
<license type=“agreement”>
Details of the offer
</license>
Other negotiation mechanisms such as auctions and bidding dis-
cussed in [5] can also be accommodated by increasing the vocabu-
lary of the license states. Thus the complete set, as discussed in [5]
would be:
• Agreement (the complete agreement, and the default state)
• Request





As discussed in the course of the individual license elements,
each element other than the licensors can indicate whether they are
negotiable or not. It does not make sense to allow licensees to
negotiate the inclusion of licensors as part of the agreement.
5.10 Visual Model
From the definition of the model in this section, we can create a
UML model of L as shown in figure 2. We have expressed b as a
“licensee group” and pi as a “third party group” to enable the more
complex expressions which we described in section 5.5.
5.11 Comparison to Current RELs
There are a number of REL specifications available currently, but
well known, standardised specifications of MPEG-REL (based on
XrML) and OMA-REL (based on ODRL 1) are hardly used [26].
Even though RELs can be seen as an expression of access con-
trol [10], neither ODRL 1 nor XrML have formalised models for
their specifications. Mulligan and Burstein did create a simple
model for XrML in [28], as shown in figure 3, but it can not be
considered a comprehensive model. However, it can be clearly seen
from the model, that many of the features presented in our model,
such as catering for duties and delegations, are missing fromXrML.
ODRL 1 (base language for OMA-REL) does not have a formal
model either, although Guth did map various components of ODRL
1 to the Contract Schema (CoSa) she developed in [18]. This was
Figure 3: Simple XrML Model
recognised, and the requirements specification for ODRL 2, does
state the need for a formal specification for the language [22]. The
latest draft of the ODRL 2 model specification does have a UML
model, which is shown in figure 4. This model is very similar to our
model shown in figure 2, although the ODRL model does provide
a lot more detail.
There are a few differences between the ODRL model and the
model we have presented in this paper:
1. Prohibition and Permission: ODRL has an explicit support
for the “NOT” permission, although there could be con-
fusion in the case where permission and prohibition are
present in the license at the same time. As we discussed
earlier, we do not believe this approach makes sense,
and thus have not implemented such a mechanism in
our model.
2. The Legal Element: The legal element provides some of the
functions that we have generalised as “contract con-
straints”; but more specifically geared towards provid-
ing a firmer legal basis for DRM use licenses.
3. Separation of Parties: In our model, we have separated the
parties into their respective functions with respect to
concluding licenses, while the ODRL model makes no
such distinctions. One advantage of our approach is
to differentiate the interpretation of the relationship be-
tween the parties and the resources, which is not possi-
ble with the approach adopted for ODRL v2.
5.12 XML Schema
Due to space constraints, we cannot reproduce the XML Schema
for our LiREL model. The reader is directed to the following web-
site, http://pubs.cs.uct.ac.za/archive/00000411/, to download the
XML schema, a sample vocabulary and examples. We have repro-
duced one of these examples in the appendix. We use the {read,
write, execute} permission set, commonly used in file systems on
Unix based operating systems.
6. ANALYSIS OF ACCESS CONTROL
ENFORCEMENT
With a formal description for the use license, it is now possible
to examine the second part of access control as defined by Jajodia
et al. in [24]: the means to implement the policies correctly and
effectively. In this section, we are going to use the formal model of
LiREL to examine the issues related to the enforcement of the use
license.
Figure 2: UML model of L
Figure 4: ODRL 2 Model (Draft) [23]
6.1 Validity of Use Licenses
Before a license can be enforced, the license needs to be valid.
A license can be invalidated for three reasons:
1. It is malformed.
2. The constraints for the license cannot be met
3. The license is legally invalid.
6.1.1 Malformed License
A license is malformed if the license does not meet the specifi-
cations detailed in the model. For example, if the license does not
state any licensors, or there are other syntax errors. A license can
also be malformed if there are permissions granted by the agree-
ment that are not present in the permission set associated with the
agreement. This is the third case described in (11).
6.1.2 Constraints cannot be met
There are constraints that apply to the entire license, that can
no longer be satisfied. For example, the time limit placed on the li-
cense may have expired, or the license may have stated that it could
only be used a certain number of times. Once these constraints can
no longer be satisfied, the license becomes invalid.
6.1.3 Legally Invalid
There are two main reasons why a use license can become invalid
legally. First, the license could have been drafted by illegal means
– for example, the licensor was not authorised to provide licenses.
The second reason could be due to license revocation. Licenses can
be revoked for a number of reasons, but there are two main reasons:
the licensee can acquire a new license under different terms or one
of the parties of the license could have broken the terms of the
license.
6.2 Enforceability of Use Licenses
Even if a license is valid, it does not guarantee that the license
is enforceable at the target device. A license is only enforceable, if
the permission set associated with that license is enforceable by the
device. The consumer cannot be granted access if a license is not
enforceable.
It could be possible to allow selective enforcement of use li-
censes. In [25], the authors categorised rights enforcement in two
levels: upper and lower level enforcement. In such a case, it would
also make sense to separate enforceability into two parts. But such
a use license should ideally make use of two distinct permission
sets, one for each of the levels of enforcement.
6.3 Conflict Resolution
In [24], Jajodia et al. defined conflict resolution as the process
undertaken when there are conflicting authorisations for the same
subject. Jajodia et al. discussed three approaches to conflict reso-
lution:
1. No Conflict: A conflict state indicates an error in the access
control system.
2. Denials take precedence: A negative authorisation takes prece-
dence over a positive authorisation.
3. Permissions take precedence: A positive authorisation takes
precedence over a negative authorisation.
We propose the use of permission precedence for DRM systems.
As long as the user can present a valid and enforceable use license
for a particular action over a resource, the action should be allowed.
Jajodia et al. also discussed the conflicts arising from different del-
egated authorisations. Permission precedence addresses this issue,
and the other factors discussed by Jajodia et al. thus do not apply.
6.4 Deciding a Request
Decision on whether a user is granted an action on a resource
is undertaken by the enforcement agent, or the DRM controller.
As already discussed, given a request for permitting an action, the
DRM controller will try to allow the action, from its known set
of valid, enforceable licenses. More formally, the DRM controller
will grant an action req to a consumer k, if
∃ a license l, such that req ∈ α, k ∈ b, (15)
and the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The obligations placed on the consumer are satisfied (assum-
ing that the DRM controller can evaluate such obligations).
2. Any obligations attached to req are satisfied (assuming that
the DRM controller can evaluate such obligations).
3. The constraints (if any) placed on req are met.
Note, from (11), req only needs to be evaluated if req ∈ P´S,
where P´S is the permission set enforceable by the DRM controller.
If req ∈ P´S, then req needs to be evaluated against the permission
set of the use license, as defined in (11).
6.5 Determining Cardinality
One of the features found in many access control models, espe-
cially RBAC models such as [13], is determining cardinality of the
roles in a deployed access control system. There are possibly two
summaries that rights holders would be interested in:
1. The number of consumers who have a certain permission on
a certain resource.
2. The number of resources (and their associated permissions)
attached to a particular consumer.
While both summaries are possible to calculate, they are pro-
cessing expensive operations (taking account of revocations etc).
Furthermore, if the licensors make use of external identity man-
agement services, the calculation becomes more difficult, as the
cardinalities for roles may be much larger than than the number of
licenses issued. While this may be inconvenient for rights holders
and licensors, this is a privacy boost for licensees.
7. CONCLUSION
There is no formal description of DRM systems, including the
specification and interpretation of access control policies. We be-
lieve DRM is another form of access control, and there are a num-
ber of differences between DRM and other well known access con-
trol models.
In this paper we presented a formal description of LiREL, a
rights expression language that is able to express access control
policies and contractual agreement in a single use license. Our for-
mal description include:
1. The representation of the involved parties, individually or in
groups. The three parties involved in a licensing agreement
are the licensees, the licensors and third parties.
2. The representation of the resources covered by the license.
3. The details of the terms and conditions (the agreement) for
access to the resources. Our model allows for the expression
of multiple simultaneous conditions that need to be satisfied
for access to be granted.
4. The representation of the constraints and obligations attached
to individual parties and access terms. Constraints can also
be attached to the entire license.
We also discussed the interpretation of LiREL, and the impli-
cations for the enforcement of DRM policies expressed in LiREL,
including multiple conflicting licenses.
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